This article proposes that all psychologists-and all psychologies-are innately concerned with justice, and yet there is no consensually defined discipline of psychology, and no consensual understanding of social justice. Adopting an intergroup and identitybased model of what is and what should be, we will describe the mechanisms whereby identities and perceptions of justice are formed, contested, and changed over time. We will argue that psychological research and practice have implications for social justice even where-and perhaps especially when-these are not made (...) explicit. Psychology is considered as the product of diverse groups with distinct and evolving identities, and with differential access to resources and power, which dynamically contest different normative perceptions of justice. (shrink)

We tested whether the impact of an organizational transgression on consumer sentiment differs depending on whether the organization is a nonprofit. Competing hypotheses were tested: that people expect higher ethical standards from a nonprofit than a commercial organization, and so having this expectation violated generates a harsher response and that a nonprofit’s reputation as a moral entity buffers it against the negative consequences of transgressions. In three experiments participants were told that an organization had engaged in fraud, exploitation of women, (...) or unethical labor practices. Consistent with the moral disillusionment hypothesis, decreases in consumer trust post-transgression were greater when the organization was described as nonprofit, an effect that was mediated by expectancy violations. This drop in trust then flowed through to consumer intentions and consumer word of mouth intentions. No support was found for the moral insurance hypothesis. Results confirm that nonprofits are penalized more harshly than commercial organizations when they breach consumer trust. (shrink)

L'importance de Duns Scot (1265?-1308) pour l'histoire de la métaphysique et de l'éthique n'est plus à démontrer. En demandant à Olivier Boulnois de recueillir ces études, Philosophie tente de se faire l'écho de la floraison récente de travaux consacrés à cet auteur, aussi bien à l'étranger qu'en France. L'article de Stephen Dumont souligne la place fondamentale de Scot dans l'histoire de la métaphysique. Mais au lieu de se centrer sur la tradition moderne de la métaphysique transcendantale (de Suarez à (...) Kant), il insiste sur le fait que Scot résout l'énigme de la Métaphysique d'Aristote en réduisant sa dimension théologique de celle-ci à sa dimension ontologique. La philosophie scotiste apparaît ainsi comme l'aboutissement d'une exploration systématique des possibilités d'interprétation ouvertes par le texte aristotélicien. L'étude d'Olivier Boulnois fait la transition entre la métaphysique et l'éthique. Elle s'interroge sur le fondement métaphysique de l'éthique scotiste et montre comment le primat d'une volonté libre, et, dans le monde fini, la contingence de la loi morale, s'accompagnent d'une objectivité du bien. La rigueur de la liberté n'est précisément pas l'arbitraire. Gérard Sondag, quant à lui, pose, à partir d'un point très précis d'exégèse aristotélicienne - pour quelle raison le citoyen courageux expose-t-il sa vie quand la Cité est en danger? - la question du fondement éthique du sacrifice de soi. En rejetant, dans sa réponse, toute éthique de l'intérêt personnel, et en posant une objectivité de la norme éthique indépendante de notre propre avantage, Scot ouvre une voie qui conduit à la morale normative de Kant. Duns Scot apparaît ainsi à la fois comme le refondateur de la métaphysique comme discipline transcendantale et comme un penseur original de l'éthique. Unissant ces deux dimensions, il est l'auteur d'une véritable métaphysique de l'éthique. (shrink)

Desde que Tarski publicó su estudio sobreel concepto de verdad en los años 30, hasido una práctica ortodoxa el considerarque t oda i nst anci a del esquema T esverdadera. Sin embargo, algunas instanciasdel esquema son falsas. Éstas incluyen lasi nst anci as paradój i cas ej empl i f i cadaspor la oración del mentiroso. Aquí sedemuestra que un esquema mejor permiteun tratamiento uniforme de la verdad enel que las paradojas semánticas resultanser simplemente falsas.Si nc e Ta r s (...) ki publ i s he d hi s s t udy ofthe concept of truth in the 1930s, it hasbeen orthodox practice to suppose thatevery instance of the T-schema is true.However, some instances of the schemaare false. These include the paradoxicalinstances exemplified by the Liar sentence.It is shown that a better schema allows auniform treatment of truth in which thesemantic paradoxes turn out to be simplyfalse. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur la nature de l’expressivité musicale à travers deux grandes questions. La première est celle de la capacité de la musique, qui n’est pas un être sensible, à exprimer des émotions. L’auteur défend l’idée que, lorsqu’ils sont appliqués à la musique, les termes émotionnels ne renvoient pas à des émotions éprouvées mais à des caractéristiques émotionnelles, manifestes dans les sons. Cette thèse comporte un volet linguistique : il existe un usage secondaire et légitime des termes émotionnels, qui (...) ne décrit pas une émotion ressentie mais un comportement. Elle comporte également un volet psychologique : lorsque l’on fait l’expérience de la musique on lui reconna î t, en raison de son caractère dynamique, une grande similitude avec le comportement humain. L’auteur montre ainsi que la musique n’exprime pas véritablement des émotions, mais « porte » ou « présente » des caractéristiques émotionnelles. La seconde question est celle du rapport entre les émotions exprimées dans la musique et les émotions ordinaires, ressenties par les êtres sensibles. La question est envisagée à travers les réponses émotionnelles suscitées, chez l’auditeur, par l’expressivité de l’œuvre. L’auteur montre que, dans les cas non musicaux, certaines émotions sont contagieuses : face à une personne triste, j’éprouve une tristesse « réfléchie », qui se passe de justification. Or, il en va de même pour la musique : une œuvre triste aura tendance à me faire éprouver de la tristesse. Cette similitude entre les cas musicaux et les cas non-musicaux préserve le lien entre l’expressivité musicale et le monde des émotions vécues. À travers la théorie présentée dans cet article, l’auteur entend rendre compte de la valeur que nous accordons à la musique expressive : puisque l’expressivité musicale reflète l’expression des émotions humaines, elle peut nous donner une meilleure compréhension de nos sentiments. (shrink)

The retributive duty is both held by and owed to the victim of a culpable wrongdoing. This reflexive account fits nicely with a Kantian emphasis on autonomy because the Kantian account allows us to explain how a person can have a duty to oneself. The reflexive account also fits nicely with, and is in part supported by, the notion that a culpable wrongdoer forfeits some of his rights . The waivability of the retributive duty in part explains why it is (...) intuitively permissible for the victim not to punish the wrongdoer, but why the same is not true with regard to the state. The reflexive duty also fits into a consent-based account of state authority and the notion that natural duties are mostly negative. Das Opfer einer schuldhaften Verletzung seiner Rechte hat nicht nur Recht, sondern auch die Pflicht Vergeltung zu üben. Diese reflexive Erwägung paßt sehr gut zu einer Betonung des Autonomiegedankens nach der Weise Kants, da die Auffassung Kants zu erklären vermag, wie eine Person eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst haben kann. Ebenso gut paßt die reflexive Erwägung zu - und sie wird zum Teil auch gestützt von - der Erkenntnis, daß jemand, der schuldhaft Unrecht tut, einige seiner Rechte verwirkt. Freilich kann auf die Vergeltung verzichtet werden, und das erklärt teilweise, warum es unseren Intuitionen entspricht, daß es dem Opfer erlaubt ist, den Täter nicht zu strafen, während das für den Staat gerade nicht gilt. Die reflexive Pflicht paßt schließlich auch zu einer auf Einverständnis gegründeten Sichtweise staatlicher Autorität, und sie läßt sich gut vereinbaren mit der Erkenntnis, daß natürliche Pflichten zumeist negativ formuliert sind. (shrink)

Baillet’s La Vie de Monsieur Descartes was the first biography of Descartes that had any claims on being more than a sketch. Published in two large volumes in 1691, the year of a royal ban on the t...

I n Citizenshi p an d Migration : Globalizatio n an d th e Politic s o f Belongin g publishe d in 2000 , Alastai r Davidso n an d I showe d tha t globalisatio n an d migratio n thro w u p serious challenge s fo r citizenship . Thi s articl e goe s further , b y examinin g change s resultin g from th e emergenc e o f a ne w constellatio n (...) o f internationa l politics , whic h I refe r t o a s the hierarchica l nation-stat e syste m . Th e bipola r syste m o f th e Col d Wa r i s bein g superseded b y a ne w dichotom y betwee n Nort h an d South , bu t wit h a singl e super-powe r dominating both . Fo r th e firs t tim e i n history , mos t o f th e world ’ s peopl e hav e th e lega l statu s of citizenshi p an d liv e i n politie s wit h th e lega l for m o f democrati c nation-states . Althoug h all nation-state s ar e formall y equa l i n status , ther e i s i n realit y a hierarch y wit h regar d t o such factor s a s internationa l law , rule s o n trade , monopol y o f th e mean s o f mas s destructio n and influenc e o n globa l governance . Thi s make s i t necessar y t o mov e fro m th e notio n of differentiated and contradictory citizenship tha t w e outline d i n 200 0 t o a notio n o f hierarchical citizenship, base d o n shar p difference s i n th e degre e o f empowermen t an d right s tha t citizenship o f variou s type s o f state s confers . Hierarchica l citizenshi p help s t o shap e th e right s and life-chanc e o f differen t group s a t bot h th e nationa l an d internationa l levels . I t i s closely linke d t o discourse s o n th e naturalnes s o f violenc e an d chao s i n th e South , whic h help s to legitimat e Norther n dominance. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.

Theists typically believe the following two propositions: God is omniscient, and Human beings are free. Are they consistent? In order to decide, we must first ask what they mean. Roughly, let us say that a being is omniscient if for any proposition he knows whether it is true or false. Since I have no wish to deny that there are true and false propositions about future states of affairs , omniscience includes foreknowledge, which we can say is knowledge of the (...) truth value of propositions about future states of affairs. For example, I believe the proposition ‘Davis will wear shoes tomorrow’ is true today, and if it is true today, i.e. if I will wear shoes tomorrow, an omniscient being knows today that it is true – and, if this being is eternally omniscient, he knew it millions of years ago. (shrink)

Let me begin with a true story. Years ago, early in my career as a professor of philosophy, I had a fascinating series of conversations with a student whom I will call Peter. He was a bright and incisive senior, with a double major in philosophy and psychology. Raised in a religious family, the son of a Christian minister, he was himself unable to believe. His doubts were too strong. But the odd fact was that he genuinely wanted to believe. (...) His religious scepticism deeply troubled him; part of him envied the faith of his parents. How do you go about making yourself believe?, he asked me. How do you go about having the kinds of religious experiences that lead people to faith? These were long and intense conversations, and I was unable to move Peter away from his doubts. So far as I know he is still a sceptic. (shrink)

How we feel is as vital to our survival as how we think. This claim, based on the premise that emotions are largely adaptive, serves as the organizing theme of Why We Need Religion. This book is a novel pathway in a well-trodden field of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Stephen Asma argues that, like art, religion has direct access to our emotional lives in ways that science does not. Yes, science can give us emotional feelings of wonder (...) and the sublime--we can feel the sacred depths of nature--but there are many forms of human suffering and vulnerability that are beyond the reach of help from science. Different emotional stresses require different kinds of rescue. Unlike secular authors who praise religion's ethical and civilizing function, Asma argues that its core value lies in its emotionally therapeutic power. No theorist of religion has failed to notice the importance of emotions in spiritual and ritual life, but truly systematic research has only recently delivered concrete data on the neurology, psychology, and anthropology of the emotional systems. This very recent "affective turn" has begun to map out a powerful territory of embodied cognition. Why We Need Religion incorporates new data from these affective sciences into the philosophy of religion. It goes on to describe the way in which religion manages those systems--rage, play, lust, care, grief, and so on. Finally, it argues that religion is still the best cultural apparatus for doing this adaptive work. In short, the book is a Darwinian defense of religious emotions and the cultural systems that manage them. (shrink)

From the school yard to the workplace, there’s no charge more damning than “you’re being unfair!” Born out of democracy and raised in open markets, fairness has become our de facto modern creed. The very symbol of American ethics—Lady Justice—wears a blindfold as she weighs the law on her impartial scale. In our zealous pursuit of fairness, we have banished our urges to like one person more than another, one thing over another, hiding them away as dirty secrets of our (...) humanity. In Against Fairness, polymath philosopher Stephen T. Asma drags them triumphantly back into the light. Through playful, witty, but always serious arguments and examples, he vindicates our unspoken and undeniable instinct to favor, making the case that we would all be better off if we showed our unfair tendencies a little more kindness—indeed, if we favored favoritism. Conscious of the egalitarian feathers his argument is sure to ruffle, Asma makes his point by synthesizing a startling array of scientific findings, historical philosophies, cultural practices, analytic arguments, and a variety of personal and literary narratives to give a remarkably nuanced and thorough understanding of how fairness and favoritism fit within our moral architecture. Examining everything from the survival-enhancing biochemistry that makes our mothers love us to the motivating properties of our “affective community,” he not only shows how we favor but the reasons we should. Drawing on thinkers from Confucius to Tocqueville to Nietzsche, he reveals how we have confused fairness with more noble traits, like compassion and open-mindedness. He dismantles a number of seemingly egalitarian pursuits, from classwide Valentine’s Day cards to civil rights, to reveal the envy that lies at their hearts, going on to prove that we can still be kind to strangers, have no prejudice, and fight for equal opportunity at the same time we reserve the best of what we can offer for those dearest to us. Fed up with the blue-ribbons-for-all absurdity of "fairness" today, and wary of the psychological paralysis it creates, Asma resets our moral compass with favoritism as its lodestar, providing a strikingly new and remarkably positive way to think through all our actions, big and small. (shrink)

The concepts of form and function have traditionally been defined in terms of biology and then extended to other disciplines. Stephen T. Asma examines the various interpretations of form and function in science and philosophy, reflecting on the philosophical presuppositions underlying the work of Geoffroy, Cuvier, Darwin, and others. -/- In the continental tradition of Canguilhem and Foucault, Asma's treatment of the historical form/function dispute analyzes the complex interactions among ideologies, metaphysical commitments, and research programs. Following Form and Function (...) is a significant contribution to the history of science, history of philosophy, and disputes within contemporary biology. (shrink)

Guided by neuroscience, animal behavior, evolution, philosophy, and psychology, Asma burrows deep into the human psyche to look right at the enigmatic but powerful engine that is our improvisational creativity—the source, he argues, of our remarkable imaginational capacity. How is it, he asks, that a story can evoke a whole world inside of us? How are we able to rehearse a skill, a speech, or even an entire scenario simply by thinking about it? How does creativity go beyond experience and (...) help us make something completely new? And how does our moral imagination help us sculpt a better society? As he shows, we live in a world that is only partly happening in reality. Huge swaths of our cognitive experiences are made up by “what-ifs,” “almosts,” and “maybes,” an imagined terrain that churns out one of the most overlooked but necessary resources for our flourishing: possibilities. Considering everything from how imagination works in our physical bodies to the ways we make images, from the mechanics of language and our ability to tell stories to the creative composition of self-consciousness, Asma expands our personal and day-to-day forms of imagination into a grand scale: as one of the decisive evolutionary forces that has guided human development from the Paleolithic era to today. The result is an inspiring look at the rich relationships among improvisation, imagination, and culture, and a privileged glimpse into the unique nature of our evolved minds. (shrink)

Hailed as "a feast" (Washington Post) and "a modern-day bestiary" (The New Yorker), Stephen Asma's On Monsters is a wide-ranging cultural and conceptual history of monsters--how they have evolved over time, what functions they have served for us, and what shapes they are likely to take in the future. Beginning at the time of Alexander the Great, the monsters come fast and furious--Behemoth and Leviathan, Gog and Magog, Satan and his demons, Grendel and Frankenstein, circus freaks and headless children, (...) right up to the serial killers and terrorists of today and the post-human cyborgs of tomorrow. Monsters embody our deepest anxieties and vulnerabilities, Asma argues, but they also symbolize the mysterious and incoherent territory beyond the safe enclosures of rational thought. Exploring sources as diverse as philosophical treatises, scientific notebooks, and novels, Asma unravels traditional monster stories for the clues they offer about the inner logic of an era's fears and fascinations. In doing so, he illuminates the many ways monsters have become repositories for those human qualities that must be repudiated, externalized, and defeated. (shrink)

After a long hiatus, psychology and philosophy are returning to formal study of imagination. While excellent work is being done in the current environment, this article argues for a stronger thesis than usually adopted. Imagination is not just a peripheral feature of cognition or a domain for aesthetic research. It is instead the core operating system or cognitive capacity for humans and has epistemic and therapeutic functions that ground all our sense-making activities. A sketch of imagination as embodied cognition is (...) offered, followed by suggestions of how to organize imagination studies into a more rigorous science–humanities research area. (shrink)

This article is a rebuttal to Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti’s article, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig’s Inference to the Best Explanation,” which argues that the Standard Model of current particle physics entails that non-physical things (like a supernatural God or a supernaturally resurrected body) can have no causal contact with the physical universe. As such, they argue that William Lane Craig’s resurrection hypothesis is not only incompatible with the notion of Jesus physically appearing to the (...) disciples, but the resurrection hypothesis is significantly limited in both its explanatory scope and explanatory power. This article seeks to demonstrate why their use of the Standard Model does not logically entail a rejection of the physical resurrection of Jesus when considering the scope and limitations of science itself. (shrink)

Recently a new question has emerged in the philosophy of religion: not whether God exists, but whether God’s existence is or would be preferable. The existing literature on the subject is sparse. The present essay, in dialogue form, is an attempt to marshal and evaluate arguments on both sides.

Christian Philosophical Theology constitutes a Christian philosopher's look at various crucial topics in Christian theology, including belief in God, the nature of God, the Trinity, christology, the resurrection of Jesus, the general resurrection, redemption, and theological method. The book is tightly argued, and amounts to a coherent explanation of and case for the Christian world view. While the work is written from a broadly Reformed Protestant perspective and the author does not avoid controversial topics, the aim is to present a (...) 'merely Christian' world view. That is, Stephen T. Davis attempts to write as much as possible from the perspective of the broad centre of Christian understanding. (shrink)

Let’s call “Cartesian omnipotence” the view that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs at all, even logically impossible ones. The present paper explores what can be said in support of CO. It turns out that several powerful and interesting arguments can be given in its defense, although in the end, along with the vast majority of philosophers of religion, I reject it.

Philosopher Davis argues that Christian belief in the resurrection is rational on historical, philosophical, and theological grounds. Each of the book's ten chapters takes up a different aspect of the Christian concept of bodily resurrection and subsequently deals with such matters as perservation of personal identity and soul-body dualism, issues in biblical scholarship, and the reliability of New Testament accounts.

The attitudes that characterize the contemporary “neuro-turn” were strikingly commonplace as part of the self-fashioning of social identity in the biographies and personal papers of past neurologists and neuroscientists. Indeed, one fundamental connection between nineteenth- and twentieth-century neurology and contemporary neuroscience appears to be the value that workers in both domains attach to the idea of integration, a vision of neural science and medicine that connected reductionist science to broader inquiries about the mind, brain, and human nature and in so (...) doing supposedly resolved once and for all questions germane to the human sciences, humanities, and arts. How those attitudes were produced and reproduced first in neurology and then in neuroscience; in what way they were constructed and disciplined, thereby eventuating in the contested sciences and medicines of the mind, brain, and nervous system; and even how they garnered ever-wider contemporary purchase in cultures and societies are thus fascinating problems for historians of science and medicine. Such problems shed light on ethics, practices, controversies, and the uneasy social relations within those scientific and medical domains. But more to the point of this essay: they also account for the apparent epistemological weight now accorded “the neuro” in our contemporary moment. They thus illuminate in a rather different way why historians have suddenly discovered the value of “the neuro.”. (shrink)

Asma, a professor of Buddhism at Columbia College in Chicago and the author of Stuffed Animals and Pickled Heads (2001), recounts his intense and revelatory Cambodian adventures while teaching at Phnom Penh's Buddhist Institute. In an electrifying and frank mix of hair-raising anecdotes and expert analysis, he explicates the vast difference between text-based Buddhist teachings and daily life in a poor and politically volatile Buddhist society. Amid tales of massage parlors, marijuana-spiced pizza, and bloodshed, he cogently explains how Theravada Buddhism, (...) the form practiced throughout Southeast Asia, differs from the Buddhism Westerners are familiar with, and how entwined it is with animistic beliefs. This fusion of Buddhist rationalism with superstition is but one of many juxtapositions Asma relishes as he assesses the terrible scars left by the Khmer Rouge and the profound self-possession of the people he meets. His striking insights into Cambodian reality lead to a bracing critique of American pop culture and the manipulative tactics of Cambodia-based fundamentalist Protestant missionaries--and an incisive argument for learning about and respecting religions other than one's own. Donna Seaman Copyright © American Library Association. (shrink)

This work is an examination of the metaphysical presuppositions involved in the science of organic form. Taking the dichotomy of structuralism versus functionalism in nineteenth century biology as the central subject of my study, I explore a network of unquestioned premises and isolate areas where empirical research programs and underlying metaphysical commitments both inform and hinder each other. ;I begin with the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of 1830--a debate that clearly articulates the tensions between structuralist and functionalist approaches to organic form. On (...) the side of functionalism, I am led to confront the rich concept of teleological causality. The concept of teleology, frequently taken to be semantically univocal, in fact unfolds into a cluster of related notions. I begin to demarcate significant differences between "intentional," "heuristic," "cosmic," and "organismic" teleology. On the side of structuralism, I set out to unearth the presuppositions of materialist versus idealist conceptions of structure--showing where naturalists have been both liberated and enslaved by their respective metaphysical commitments. With the basic divisions between structuralist and functionalist drawn, I set out to trace the dichotomy through the paradigm shift from fixism to transformism. ;In Darwin's system the structural/functional tensions become synthesized into complementary principles of causality. Here I explore the underlying presuppositional shifts which enabled Darwin to harmonize the previously intractable oppositions. These shifts include: rethinking teleology without "design," rethinking the archetype as real progenitor, and adopting a pluralistic perspective regarding causal mechanisms. ;The relative success of Darwin's appropriation of structuralism and functionalism leads to a discussion of the dichotomous character of the central subject itself. I argue that at the root of the dichotomous characterization of structure and function lies an impoverished understanding of teleology. I then offer "organicist" teleology as a powerful alternative to the French-Anglo tradition of "intentional" teleology. Presupposing the alternative teleology forms a challenge to the way in which French-Anglo naturalists have understood structural and functional relations. Together with Darwin's causal pluralism, a richer notion of teleology provides a different set of metaphysical assumptions and leads to an alternative model for empirical research programs. (shrink)

Recently, in this journal, Jeremy Gwiazda has offered a critique of our separationist view of hell. His objection relies on two key assumptions, and we show in our reply that both assumptions can be denied.

How do we prove the existence of God? This book tackles head-on this fundamental question. It examines a cross-section of theistic proofs, explaining in clear terms what they are and what they try to accomplish.

The natural history museum is a place where the line between "high" and "low" culture effectively vanishes--where our awe of nature, our taste for the bizarre, and our thirst for knowledge all blend happily together. But as Stephen Asma shows in Stuffed Animals and Pickled Heads, there is more going on in these great institutions than just smart fun. Asma takes us on a wide-ranging tour of natural history museums in New York and Chicago, London and Paris, interviewing curators, (...) scientists, and exhibit designers, and providing a wealth of fascinating observations. We learn how the first museums were little more than high-toned side shows, with such garish exhibits as the pickled head of Peter the Great's lover. In contrast, today's museums are hot-beds of serious science, funding major research in such fields as anthropology and archaeology. "Rich in detail, lucid explanation, telling anecdotes, and fascinating characters.... Asma has rendered a fascinating and credible account of how natural history museums are conceived and presented. It's the kind of book that will not only engage a wide and diverse readership, but it should, best of all, send them flocking to see how we look at nature and ourselves in those fabulous legacies of the curiosity cabinet."--The Boston Herald. (shrink)

Christian Philosophical Theology constitutes a Christian philosopher's look at various crucial topics in Christian theology, including belief in God, the nature of God, the Trinity, christology, the resurrection of Jesus, the general resurrection, redemption, and theological method. The book is tightly argued, and amounts to a coherent explanation of and case for the Christian world view. Although written from a broadly Reformed Protestant perspective, and although the author does not avoid controversial topics, his aim is to present a `merely Christian' (...) world view (to adapt slightly C. S. Lewis's famous term). That is, he attempts to write as much as possible from the perspective of the broad centre of Christian understanding. (shrink)